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The Good Friday Agreement or Belfast Agreement (Irish: Comhaontú Bhéal Feirste or Comhaontú Aoine an Chéasta, Ulster Scots: Bilfawst Greement or Guid Friday Greeance,[1] sometimes called the Stormont Agreement, was a major political development in the Northern Ireland peace process. The Agreement was made up of two inter-related documents, both signed at Belfast on 10 April 1998 (Good Friday): a multi-party agreement by most of Northern Ireland's political parties, and an international agreement between the British and Irish governments. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was the only major political group in Northern Ireland to oppose the Agreement.
The Belfast Agreement set out a complex series of provisions relating to a number of areas, including: the future status and system of government within Northern Ireland; the relationship between Northern Ireland and institutions in both the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom; human rights; the principle of respect for each of Northern Ireland's communities and their traditions; the decommissioning of arms held by the various paramilitary groups, the release of members of paramilitary groups from prison; and the normalisation of British security arrangements within Northern Ireland.
The Agreement was approved by voters in Northern Ireland at a referendum held on 23 May 1998, while on the same day the Agreement was tacitly approved by voters in the Republic of Ireland at a referendum to amend the Constitution in conformity with the Agreement.
The Agreement came into force on 2 December 1999.[2][3] The present constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland's devolved system of government (made up of the Northern Ireland Assembly and a joint executive based on cross-community power-sharing) are based on the Belfast Agreement, as well as on the 2006 St Andrews Agreement.
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The Agreement is an international agreement between the British and Irish governments. It comprises two elements: the legal agreement between the two governments and a more substantive agreement between eight political parties and the two governments. That former text is very short. It has just four articles.[3] It is that short text which is the legal agreement. The Northern Ireland political parties were not involved in its negotiation. However, the short legal agreement incorporates in its Schedules the latter agreement reached by the eight political parties (the Ulster Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, Sinn Féin, the Alliance Party, the Progressive Unionist Party, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, the Ulster Democratic Party and the Labour Group) and the two governments.[3] Technically, this Scheduled agreement can be distinguished as the multi-party agreement as opposed to the Belfast Agreement itself.[3]
Vague wording of some of the provisions (described as "constructive ambiguity"),[4] which helped ensure acceptance of the agreement at the time, served to postpone debate on some of the more contentious issues—most notably paramilitary decommissioning, police reform and normalisation. A date of May 2000 was set for total disarming of all paramilitary groups. This was not achieved and delayed the establishment of the Assembly and Executive,[5] because of claims by unionists that one of the main parties in the Assembly, Sinn Féin had links with the paramilitary group, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). In line with those claims, unionists refused to share power with this party while the IRA remained armed. In September 2005, the IRA decommissioned their weapons.[6]
In May 1998, there were separate referendums concerning the Belfast Agreement. The referendum in Northern Ireland was a direct vote on the Agreement, while the vote in the Republic of Ireland was a vote to amend the Irish constitution in line with the Belfast Agreement.
The result of these referendums was a large majority in both parts of Ireland in favour of the Agreement. In the Republic, 56% of the electorate voted, with 94% of the votes in favour of the amendment to the Constitution. The turnout in Northern Ireland was 81%, with 71% of the votes in favour of the Agreement.
In the Republic, the electorate voted upon the nineteenth amendment to the Constitution of Ireland. This amendment both permitted the state to comply with the Belfast Agreement and provided for the removal of the 'territorial claim' contained in Articles 2 and 3. Ireland voted upon the Amsterdam Treaty on the same day. The results of the two simultaneous referendums on the Belfast Agreement were as follows:
| Turnout | Yes | No | Totals | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northern Ireland | 81% | 676,966 (71%) | 274,879 (29%) | 951,845 (100%) |
| Republic of Ireland | 56% | 1,442,583 (94%) | 85,748 (6%) | 1,528,331 (100%) |
Direct London rule came to an end in Northern Ireland when power was formally devolved to the new Northern Ireland Assembly, the North-South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council when commencement orders for the British-Irish Agreement came into effect on 2 December.[7][8][9] However, Article 4(2) of the British-Irish Agreement (the Agreement between the British and Irish governments for the implementation of the Belfast Agreement) required the two governments to notify each other in writing of the completion of the requirements for the entry into force of the Belfast Agreement.[10] Entry into force was to be upon the receipt of the latter of the two notifications. The British government agreed to participate in a televised ceremony at Iveagh House in Dublin, the Irish department of foreign affairs. Peter Mandelson, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, attended early on 2 December 1999. He exchanged notifications with David Andrews, the Irish foreign minister. Shortly after the ceremony, at 10.30 am, the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern signed the declaration formally amending Articles 2 & 3 of the Irish Constitution. He then announced to the Dáil that the British-Irish Agreement had entered into force (including certain supplementary agreements concerning the Belfast Agreement).[3][11]
The Assembly and Executive were eventually established in December 1999 on the understanding that decommissioning would begin immediately, but were suspended within two months due to lack of progress, before being re-established in May 2000 as Provisional IRA decommissioning eventually began. Aside from the decommissioning issue, however, ongoing paramilitary activity (albeit relatively low level compared to the past) by the Provisional Irish Republican Army — e.g., arms importations, smuggling, organised crime, "punishment beatings", intelligence-gathering and rioting — was also a stumbling block. The loyalist paramilitaries also continued similar activity although as they were not represented by a significant political party, their position was less central to political change.
The overall result of these problems was to damage confidence among unionists in the Agreement, which was exploited by the anti-Agreement DUP which eventually defeated the pro-Agreement Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in the 2003 Assembly election. The UUP had already resigned from the power-sharing Executive in 2002 following arrests of Sinn Féin personnel on charges of gathering intelligence for use by terrorists. These charges were eventually dropped in 2005 on the controversial grounds that pursuit would not be "in the public interest". Immediately afterwards, one of the accused Sinn Féin members, Denis Donaldson was exposed as a British agent.
In 2004, negotiations were held between the two governments, the DUP, and Sinn Féin on an agreement to re-establish the institutions. These talks failed, but a document published by the governments detailing changes to the Belfast Agreement became known as the 'Comprehensive Agreement'. On 26 September 2005, however, it was announced that the Provisional Irish Republican Army had completely decommissioned its arsenal of weapons and "put them beyond use". Nonetheless, many unionists, most notably the DUP, remained sceptical and agreement on how to restore the power-sharing assembly still had not been reached as of July 2006. Of the loyalist paramilitaries, only the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) had decommissioned any weapons.[12] Further negotiations took place in October 2006, leading to the St Andrews Agreement.
In May 2007, a power sharing executive was again established to govern Northern Ireland in devolved matters. The second Northern Ireland Executive consisted of the DUP and Sinn Féin, with Ian Paisley of the DUP as First Minister and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Féin as Deputy First Minister. Although Paisley was the head of the government, he and Martin McGuinness held equal powers within the Northern Ireland Assembly government.
Paisley retired from the office of First Minister and from the leadership of the DUP on 5 June 2008 and was succeeded in both functions by Peter Robinson. In the third Northern Ireland Executive the same political relationship now exists between Robinson and McGuinness as existed formerly between Paisley and McGuinness.
Some commentators have referred to the Agreement as "Sunningdale for slow learners", which suggests that it was nothing more than what was on offer in the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973.[13] This assertion has been criticised by political scientists one of whom stated that "..there are... significant differences between them [Sunningdale and Belfast], both in terms of content and the circumstances surrounding their negotiation, implementation, and operation".[14] The main issues omitted by Sunningdale and addressed by the Belfast agreement are the principle of self-determination, the recognition of both national identities, the British-Irish intergovernmental cooperation and the legal procedures to make power-sharing mandatory, such as the cross-community vote and the d'Hondt system to appoint ministers to the executive.[15][16] Former IRA member and journalist Tommy McKearney says that the main difference is the intention of the British government to broker a comprehensive deal by including the IRA and the most uncompromising Unionism.[17]
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